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Abstract— In general agricultural policies aim to
achieve several objectives using different
combinations of instruments. In this study, our aim is
to analyse how efficiently policy instruments used in
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy respond to
policy objectives. We will present a formal framework
to analyse the effects of instruments to a particular
objectives. Our analysis will reveal that there are
several controversies between stated agricultural
policy objectives and policy instruments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In agricultural economics literature agricultural
policies are often divided under two categories.
Redistributive policies aim to transfer income from
consumers to farmers. The most common example
of redistributive policy measures is different types of
price supports. The second category is policies
implemented to correct market failures. Market
failures associated to agriculture are i.e.
environmental concerns, rural viability, food safety
and food security. These elements have played an
important role in agricultural policies; especially in
developed countries [1]. Yet, these two categories of
policy objectives are often brought more concrete
with stated policy objectives.
T h e  s t a t e d  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  E U ’ s  C o m m o n
A g ri c ul t u ral  Po l i cy  are  s e t  i n  t h e  Tre at y  o f  Ro m e
signed in 1957. According to article 33, the
objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy are:
‘To increase agricultural productivity, by promoting
technical progress, ensuring the rational
development of agricultural production and by
ensuring the optimum utilisation of the factors of
production, in particular labour, and thus; to ensure
a  f a i r  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  f o r  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l
commodity, in particular; by increasing the
individual earnings of persons engaged to
agriculture; stabilise markets; assure the availability
of supplies; and to ensure that supplies reach
consumers at reasonable prices’ [2].
To achieve stated policy objectives a set of policy
measures need to be defined. From early 1960s until
early 1980s the main policy measure in the EU’s
CAP was price support supplemented with trade
restrictions, tariffs and export subsidies. Rapidly
increased production due to technological
development and productivity growth, as well as the
enlargement of the EU from EU6 to EU10
challenged the policy and its measures. During this
20 year period, the EU shifted from food importer to
major food exporter. Yet, internal markets were
facing increasing overproduction and agricultural
expenditures. The main policy response was that
price supports were supplemented with production
controls, such as set-aside and production quotas.
Also export restrictions and co-responsibility levies
were used [3].
In order to permanently decrease production,
reduce expenditures and minimise trade distortions,
a fundamental reform was needed. A major shift
started in 1992, when price supports were reduced
and compensated with direct acreage based
payments. In 2003 these payments were decoupled
on production.
According to Tinbergen [4], for policies to be
efficient at least one policy measure is needed for
each objective. A review on the stated objectives of
the CAP and the policy measures used since 1957
i n d i c a t e ,  t h a t  t h e  C A P  f a i l s  t o  r e s p o n d  t o
Tinbergen’s rule. Until 1980s price support was
dominant policy measure. At the same time there
were several objectives set in the CAP. In addition,
price support had controversial effects with respect
to different policy objectives. In example, price12
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support was implemented to increase producers’
incomes. It led, however, also to higher consumer
prices. Thus, price support made it more difficult to
keep consumer prices at reasonable level, as stated
in the Treaty of Rome.
II. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
In this study, we will empirically estimate how
well past and current agricultural policy instruments
have been able to respond to the stated objectives of
agricultural policies. The analysis will reveal the
trade-offs between and within stated agricultural
policy objectives and policy instruments. The
additional value of this study is that instead of
deadweight losses, it measures the efficiency of
different policy instruments in terms of their effects
on stated policy objectives. We define this as the
political efficiency of agricultural policies. Thus, it
differs from a traditional welfare economics policy
analysis that measures efficiency in terms of social
costs. Theoretical background is in welfare
economics and in economic policy.
Stated agricultural policy objectives in the
European Union and in Finland are quantified to
comparable indexes. Using these indexes an
objective function is constructed. Sophisticated
estimation procedures are used to reveal the relative
efficiency of different policy vector on the stated
objectives.
T h e  a n a l y s i s  c o v e r s  t i m e  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 8 0  t o
2006. We will construct an objective function (or a
political preference function) to describe stated
agricultural policy objectives in the EU and in
F i n l a n d .  T h e  re s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o
improve policy efficiency in future agricultural
policies. In addition, it will reveal evidence on
which instruments could be used more efficiently to
achieve particular policy objectives.
III. FORMAL FRAMEWORK
Po l i t i c al  p re fe re n ce  f un c ti o n s  ( PPF)  are  u s e d  to
measure relative political power or social welfare
weights of political interest groups, first introduced
b y  R a u s s e r  a n d  F r e e b a i r n  [ 5 ] .  P P F  i s  a s s u m e d  t o
incorporate both the political preferences and the
influence activities of political actors and groups
involved. The PPF models assume that the interest
group pressure forces the government to consider a
set of criteria that roughly corresponds to the desires
of the various interest groups. Thus, these criteria
are arguments in governments PPF. In a PPF model
the government chooses the types and degrees of
intervention to maximise an objective function
dependent on these multiple criteria [6]. The
political preference weights are often revealed from
policy outcomes that are assumed directly or
indirectly reflect the impact of various actors on
governmental decision-making [7].
In the PPF approach to modelling political
economic decision-making, a policy-maker chooses
levels of policy instruments to maximise a function
of special interests’ welfare subject to feasible
constraints [8].
Government’s objective is to maximise a political
preference function. According to van der Zee [9]
the arguments appearing in the PPF typically
represent performance measures which reflect the
economic well-being of each interest group. The
fundamental assumption behind PPF is that
government is rational. Following Bullock [10] we
can write government’s maximisation problem
(PPF-max) as
      b F b x h u t s u g Max
x    , . . (1)
where g represents government preferences as a
function of overall utility in society and F is a set of
technically feasible policy instruments available,
given the market parameters b [10]. In other words,
government chooses some set of politically and
technically feasible policy instruments to maximise
overall welfare in society. This welfare
maximisation is measured in terms of interest
groups’ welfare given that policy-makers may
weight different interest groups differently.
According to Gardner [7] PPF studies assume that
policies influence the level of the political
preference function only by influencing peoples’
incomes. Yet, this is done to evade the problems
relating to utility measurement. However, the level
of PPF which is an indicator of political objectives12
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depends upon the way in which peoples’ incomes
enter it.
A. Target-Instrument Approach (The Theory of
Economic Policy)
The theory of economic policy holds the
normative premises that the government can pursue
an optimal economic policy by operating a set of
instruments and by fine-tuning the instrument levels
in order to reach a priori well-defined targets [9].
The welfare economic policy analysis defines
optimality in terms of maximising social welfare
function and thus individual welfare and ranks
policies based on Pareto criteria. Target-instrument
approach allows the comparison of different policies
based on their ability to achieve particular
objectives. As in our case in agricultural policies, it
is easy to define several stated objectives and thus,
to measure policy efficiency in terms of these
objectives. According to Bullock et al. [11], stated
policy objectives are indicators of policy success
while the end of each policy is to increase social
welfare. Thus, achieving stated policy objectives
leads to higher social welfare.
Tinbergens’ target-instrument approach can be
formalised as follows. Let
  n y y y y y ,..., , , 3 2 1   (2)
be a vector of well defined policy objectives. Yet, let
  n x x x x x ,..., , , 3 2 1   (3)
be a vector of policy instruments and
  n z z z z z ,..., , , 3 2 1   (4)
vector of exogenous variables. Now, the economy is
presented as
Bz Ax y    (5)
w h e r e  A  a n d  B  a r e  r e d u c e d  f o r m  m a t r i c e s  o f
coefficients. If the number of target variables equals
the number of instruments variables and if matrix A
is non-singular, it is possible to express x in terms of
y such that
> @ Bz y A x   
 * 1
(6)
where y* can be interpreted as the vector of optimal
target levels.
Policy solutions are to be found only if the
number of policy instruments is equal to or larger
than the number of targets. When the number of
instruments is smaller than the number of targets,
the targets cannot be met simultaneously. When
different sets of instruments are available to attain
the same target levels, the Tinbergen approach
offers no selection criteria [9].
The same model was later extended to cover also
flexible targets. Instead of maximising ex ante
chosen target variables, focus was on maximisation
of social utility or welfare function U, which
depends on target (y) as well as instrument variables
(x) [4], [12]. This welfare function is represented as
    m n x x y y U x y U ,..., ; ,..., , 1 1    (7)
Given the restrictions imposed by the modelled
relationships in economy, we can now explicitly
analyse the policy-makers preferences’ with respect
to the levels of targets x and instruments y. Thus,
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The first term of the equation represents the
overall change in social welfare, that occurs when a
marginal change in policy instrument has affect on a
particular target variable yk and the marginal change
in target variable yk affects on the other y k-1 target
v a r i a b l e s .  A s  s t a t e d  b y  G a r d n e r  [ 7 ]  t h e  r e l e v a n t
aspect of the function for most policy questions is its
partial derivatives with respect to different policy
objectives, such as individuals’ incomes.
Evaluating policies means assessing a change in
policy. Optimal policy is arrived at when any change
reduces U. The partial derivatives can be thought of
as weights. If a change in instrument has the same
size affect on all the objectives, then all the
objectives are weighted equally and no trade-offs are
present. The theory of economic policy requires that
the set of policy instruments includes only those
variables under the direct control of the policy-
maker. For example, one should specify the tariff
instead of the tariff revenue, and the discount rate
instead of interest rate [9].
As shown above, the policy objective function
can be considered either as a policy target functions
a s  p e r c e i v e d  b y  t h e  p o l i c y  m a k e r  o r  a s  a  s o c i a l
welfare function. It is similar to PPF that makes
explicit trade-offs among various economic groups.
A c c o r d i n g  t o  v a n  d e r  Z e e  [ 9 ]  t h e r e  e x i s t s  f i v e
different approaches to trace the arguments and/or
weights of an objective function: (i) the direct
method in which the decision maker is invited to
write down preference function directly; (ii) the
interview method in which the expert establishes the
function on the basis of hypothetical questions to
policymakers concerning preference comparisons
between alternative states or results (iii) the
imaginary interview method, according to which
preferences are inferred on the basis of actual
deliberations of decision-maker before policy
decisions are made, followed or taken part by an
expert, (iv) the inference method in which the
preferences are retrieved from planning documents
and (v) indirect revealed preference method.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
Our empirical analysis will reveal the marginal
effects of a single policy measures with respect to
particular policy objectives. We will construct
policy objective functions to describe the
development in agricultural policies both in the EU
and in Finland. The period analysed is from 1980
until 2006. Using the estimated marginal effects, we
can find different combinations of policy measures
that will improve the policy efficiency in terms on
stated policy objectives of the CAP. We use data
from agricultural statistics in the EU and in Finland.
Econometric software used is Limdep. Currently, we
are in a stage of final data collection and preliminary
estimations.
Table 1. Measurement of policy variables
Policy objective Measurement of Y Policy vector, endogenous
variables X
Exogenous variables Z
Securing farmers’ income Agricultural income
Increase productivity Productivity growth
Structural development Farm size, agricultural labour
Market stabilisation Price volatility, production
volatility
Reasonable  consumer  prices  Food  price  index
Environmental concerns Environmental Benefit Index
Availability of supplies Self-sufficiency in relevant
food stuffs
Price support, direct payment,
production quota, set-aside, co-
responsibility levy, import





Share of agriculture in GDP, share
of agriculture in employment, total
expenditure on agriculture,
technological development12
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a formal framework to
analyse controversies between agricultural policy
instruments and policy objectives. Based on the
theory only, our expected results are that the
measures of the CAP have controversial effects on
the different stated policy objectives. These
controversial effects are expected to be stronger in
Finland than in the EU. That is mainly because of
different farm structure and structural development
during the period under consideration. In order to
improve the efficiency of the CAP, more targeted
and directed policy measures are needed. Yet, the
CAP fails to fulfil Tinbergen’s rule that at least one
policy measure is needed for every objective.
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